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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY
BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCES- TIME OF DETERMINING-
VOIDABILITY
Sections 6o (a) and 6o (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, i i U.S.C.A.
96 (a) and 96 (b) deal with preferences. Sec. 6o (a) defines a prefer-
ence and Sec. 6o (b) lays down the test for determining whether or
not the preference is voidable at the instance of the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. In Palmer Clay Products v. Brown, 8o L.Ed. 466, 56 S. Ct.
450 (1936) a payment on account was received by a creditor within
four months of the bankruptcy of the debtor, at a time when the debtor
could have paid all his creditors the same proportion of their claims.
It was held that the payment was preferential.
Where the transfer is for a present consideration it cannot operate
as a preference, even though the debtor is then insolvent, for the estate
of the bankrupt would not be diminished or depleted to the prejudice of
the creditors. Samples v. Getrman-McDonnell-Summers Drug Co. et al.
14 Fed. (2d) 170 (D.C. Okl. 1926) ; Johnson v. Burke Manor Bldg.
Corp. 48 Fed. (2d) 1031 (C.C.A. 7 th 1931); In re Finley 6 Fed.
Supp. 105 (D.C. N.C. 1933); Goldstein v. Rusch 56 Fed. (2d) 1O
(C.C.A. 2d 1932); McClure v. Heim-Overly Realty Co. 71 Fed.
(2d) IOO (C.C.A. 8th 1934).
When a transfer is made for a past consideration, three theories
have been advanced for determining whether or not a preference is
created. 3 U. of Ch. L. Rev. 138; 20 Va. L. Rev. 583. One line of
cases has held that no preference has been given if at the time of the
transfer the debtor could have paid all the other creditors of the same
class the same proportion of their claims, Haas v.Sachs 68 Fed. (2d) 623
(C.C.A. 8th 1933);Doggett v. Chelsea Trust Co. 73 Fed. (2d)
614 (C.C.A. ISt 1934); Latrobe et al. v. J. H. Cross Co. 29 Fed.
(2d) 210 (D.C. Pa. 1928). Other courts have held such a transfer
to be preferential if it would be so at the time the insolvent was adjudged
bankrupt. Commerce-Guardian Trust & Savings Bank v. Delvin
6 Fed. (2d) 518 (C.C.A. 6th 1925); Swift v. Higgins 72 Fed. (2d)
791 (C.C.A. 9 th 1934). And it has been argued that the preferen-
tial character should be determined at the date of final distribution of
the bankrupt estate. See W. S. Peck & Co. v.Whittmer, 231 Fed. 893
(C.C.A. 8th 1916); Slayton v. Drown, 93 Vt. 290, 17o Ad. 307
(1919); Remington, 3rd Ed. Sec. 1813, 20 Va. L. Rev. 583.
The Palmer case, has settled this conflict, the court there saying:
"Whether a creditor has received a preference is to be determined, not
by what the situation would have been if the debtor's assets had been
liquidated and distributed among his creditors at the time the alleged
preferential payment was made, but by the actual effect of the payment
as determined when bankruptcy results." This decision, however, will
be nullified, if a bill now in the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives becomes law. This bill, H.R. 10382, in effect adopts
the third theory set out above that the preferential character should be
determined at the date of final distribution of the bankrupt estate.
A closely related problem of preferences was presented in Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Coggin, 78 Fed. (2d) 471 (C.C.A. 4 th,
1933) where an unrecorded mortgage was given in North Carolina
more than four months before bankruptcy. Recording was made or
possession was delivered within four months. The state law permitted
but did not require recording except as to judgment creditors or subse-
quent purchasers without notice. The court held that the transfer could
not be avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy. While such a preferential
transfer is an act of bankruptcy under Sec. 3 (a) 2, II U.S.C.A. 21
(a) 2, and is actionable for a period of four months subsequent to the
possession or recording under Sec. 3 (b), x i U.S.C.A. 21 (b), Collier
on Bankruptcy, 3rd Ed., p. i82b; Glenn on Liquidation, Sec. 199; c.f.,
Remmington on Bankruptcy 4 th Ed., Sec. 197, it is not so clear that it
is voidable under Sec. 6o (b). This section provides that, "If a bank-
rupt shall . . . have made a transfer of any of his property, and if at
the time of the transfer . . . . or of the recording or registering of
the transfer if by law recording or registering thereof is required, and
the transfer shall then operate as a preference, it shall be voidable by the
trustee."
In Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430, 36 S. Ct. 386, 6o L. Ed.
726, L.R.A. 19 17A 295 (1916), it was said that unless recording was
required in order to make a transfer valid as against those concerned in
the distribution of the bankrupt's estate, that is, as against creditors
including those whose position the trustee is entitled to take by virtue
of Sec. 47 (a) 2, 1I U.S.C.A. 75 (a) 2, such a transfer cannot be
avoided if made prior to the four months period.
At the time of the Carey v. Donohue decision and until 1926, sec-
tions 6o (a) and 6o (b) read alike in that neither section had any
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provision as to permissive recording. In 1926 Congress amended sec-
tion 6o (a) to provide for permissive recording. By its terms Sec. 6o
(a) refers only to the running of the four months period in identifying
the transfer as a preference. It does not state what preferences are
voidable. Accordingly, the provision regarding required recording in
Sec. 6o (b), which alone states what preferential transfers are voidable,
is not affected by the broadening of the scope of Sec. 6o (a) to include
permissive recording. If in fact the greater power to avoid preferences
now exists in favor of the trustee, by virtue of the amendment to Sec.
6o (a), it does not appear to have been successfully exercised. The
reported cases with some few exceptions, stay well within the rule of
Cary v. Donohue, supra. Stover v. Valley Nat. Bank, 48 Fed. (2d)
54 (C.C.A. 3rd 193); Bank of Wadesboro v. Little 71 Fed. (2d)
513 (C.C.A. 4th 1934); Northern Bond & Mortgage Co. v. King,
24 Fed. (2d), i56 (C.C.A. 7 th 1928); In re Gibson et al, 65 Fed.
(2d) 921 (C.C.A. 6th 1933); In re Cunningham 64 Fed. (2d) 296
(C.C.A. 4 th 1933); First Nat. Bank of Lincoln v. Live Stock Nat.
Bank 3 Fed. (2d) 416 (C.C.A. 8th 1929); Lewis v. Ornstein
12 Fed. (2d) 652 (C.C.A. 2nd 1926); Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno v.
Gorbia, 25 Fed. (2d) 817 (C.C.A. 1st 1928); McLaughlin, Amend-
ments of the Bankruptcy Act, 4o Harv. L. Rev. 374, 377.
As stated above, a few courts have refused to follow the rule of the
Carey case. They contend that sections 6o (a) and (b) should be read
together. This contention leads to the result that, where recording of
a transfer is permitted by state law, the transfer is voidable by the
trustee, if recording is so delayed as to take place within four months of
filing the petition in bankruptcy. These courts say that unless such a
construction is given to the 1926 amendment to Sec. 6o (a) it is a
nullity. In re Jackson, (Dist. Ct., W.D. Ark. Fort Smith Div.) 9 Fed.
Supp. 719 (1935); Matter of Bowles (Ref., Dist. Ct. Nebr. Omaha
Div.) 14 Am. B.R. (N.S.) 133 (1928), and see Foltz v. Davis 68
Fed. (2d) 495 (C.C.A. 7th 1934); and Matter of Wood (Western
Div. of Texas, Ref.) 21 Am. B.R. (N.S.) 502 (932). The effect
of the proposed legislation H.R. io382, supra, is the adoption of this
minority holding.
The Hartford case, therefore, in holding that a preferential transfer
made prior to four months of filing the petition in bankruptcy but
recorded on possession taken within four months of such filing is not
voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy, though the North Carolina law
permitted recording, follows the rule of the Carey case and is in line
with the majority of the cases in point.
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No other section of the Bankruptcy Act seems available to the
trustee. If the transfer has been effected prior to bankruptcy, he has
no lien under Sec. 47 (a) 2; and his derivative powers under Sec.
70 (e), I I U.S.C.A. 107 (e), to exercise the rights of creditors under
state law would be applicable only to transfers made prior to four months
of bankruptcy and voidable under state law.
HOWARD W. NEFFNER.
JUSTIN H. FOLKERTH.
PRIORITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
The City of Lincoln, Nebraska, a municipal corporation, sought
priority in its claim of $45,000 with interest against the Lincoln Trust
Company, bankrupt. The City based its contention on-Sec. 64b(7) of
the Bankruptcy Act and also claimed that the bankrupt had custody of
the fund as a trust fund. The district court and the circuit court
decided that the city was not within Sec. 64b(7) and the circuit court
held that there was no trust fund. Held: that a city as a municipal
corporation is entitled to priority under Sec. 64b(7) if as a matter of
local law the municipality was accorded priority. The case was re-
manded to try the issue of local law. City of Lincoln, Neb. et al. v.
L. Z. Ricketts, Trustee, etc., 56 S. Ct. 507 (U.S. Law Wk. Mar. 3,
1936, Index 607).
For an adequate understanding of this problem, the history of state
and federal priority in bankruptcy is necessary. The United States is
accorded priority in insolvent debtor's estates by R.S. Sec. 3466-67
(31 U.S.C.A. 191-192) and sureties are subrogated to this priority by
R.S. Sec. 3468 (31 U.S.C.A. 193). This statute is the same in sub-
stance as that passed as early as 1797- It has been held that the United
States has no sovereign prerogative of priority but its priority is derived
solely from Congressional enactment. United States v. The State Bank
of North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 8 L. Ed. 308 (1832). The Supreme
Court has held that R.S. Sec. 3466-68 is in pari materia with the Bank-
ruptcy Act and that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 relegates the priority
of R.S. Sec. 3466-68, if recognized at all in bankruptcy (which point
the court did not have to decide under the circumstances), to fifth place
in payment of claims under Sec. 64b(5) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
(Now 64 b(7). Guarantee Title and Trust Go. v. Title Guarantee
and Surety Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912).
Contrary to the view of some writers and lower courts, but support-
